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Reason, Feeling, and Religion: A Response to Linda McClain
Guest Blogger
For the symposium on Linda McClain, Who's the Bigot?: Learning from Conflicts
over Marriage and Civil Rights Law (Oxford University Press, 2020).
Cathleen Kaveny
Linda McClain’s book is a meticulously researched and compellingly presented
study of moral and political language. She illuminates the different ways in which
the term “bigot” has been used in American constitutional law, from the battles
over slavery in the nineteenth century to the skirmishes over same sex marriage
in the twenty-first. As they are currently configured, contemporary legal
controversies pit the religious freedom of devout Christians against the rights
LGBTQ Americans to be treated with dignity and equality in the public square.
As a theologian as well as a law professor, I have found myself increasingly
frustrated with the way in which religion is framed in today’s free exercise
litigation. Religious belief is presented as adamant, full of feeling, and insulated
from both intellectual content and broader critique. This view of religion is
supported not only by those skeptical of its value in American public life, but also
by its purported friends, such as the Becket Fund. In the long run, I believe
conceptualizing religion in a way that divorces feeling from reason will be
harmful for both religious communities themselves and for a nation that
continues to include many religious believers. McClain’s book has helped me
understand why this is the case.
The Charge of Bigotry as Prophetic Indictment
As McClain describes so well, deploying the term “bigot” shuts down the
discussion, it does not open it up. One’s target is left with only two options. On
the one hand, they can indignantly deny the charge, often reversing it. (“I’m not
the bigot, you’re the bigot!”). On the other hand, they can humbly admit guilt,
repent, and promise to reform. Human nature being what it is, this does not
happen quite as often as it should happen.
What kind of term is the word “bigot,” then?  In my view, it currently functions
as a term of prophetic indictment, a charge that someone is not acting in
accordance with the basic moral-legal charter of our polity. Just as the biblical
prophets indicted people for violating the terms of their fundamental national
covenant (between God and Israel), so those who use the term “bigot” are
condemning people who violate the terms of our national covenant, the
Constitution.  Prophetic indictment is undeniably moral language. It is not,
however, the language of moral deliberation. It does not facilitate or even
endorse finely drawn moral distinctions. Instead, prophetic indictment asks us to
see and clearly repudiate a fundamental violation of our moral covenant.
The use of prophetic indictment is an important part of American political
discourse. Its origins are equally religious and political, because it was born in a
theocracy—the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. More specifically, its roots are
in Puritan jeremiads, which are in turn modeled on the fiery indictments of Isaiah
and Jeremiah. Warning of the dire consequences divine wrath, they castigate the
people for their sins, and call for repentance and reform. As the country became
secularized, the jeremiad expanded, and its basic framework of indictment for
violation of a covenant requirement became broadened and secularized. While
the days of the Puritans are long behind us, the jeremiad remains a strong and
flexible staple of American political discourse. It has been used by liberals,
conservatives, and radicals to make their point in the public square. (See, e.g,
James Darsey, The Prophetic Tradition and Radical Rhetoric in America, 1999).
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I’m Not a Bigot, By God!
Precisely because they do not invite definitional precision, the exact meaning of
terms of prophetic indictment can be hard to pin down. McClain’s book helped
me tremendously in thinking about who labels whom a “bigot” and why. At the
same time, I remained a bit fuzzy about the actual meaning of the term. So I
consulted the Oxford English Dictionary, which provides some etymological
background, as well as some sense of why religious people might be both
especially sensitive and especially susceptible to the charge. According to the
OED, the term means either a) a religious person who is too devout or
committed to the tenets of faith; or b) a religious hypocrite. The source of the
word is unclear; some suggest that it comes from the German “bei Gott” (“by
God”), and thereby refers to oaths that religious people would take; others have
suggested that it pertains to the Beguines, a Belgian order of lay women which
was suppressed for heresy and which were associated with other groups who
used misused religion for their own gain.
A fundamental question that McClain raises throughout the book is whether
bigotry is a matter of bad reasons or a bad motive. The etymology of the term
helps explain the confusion. To say that someone is too religious is to say that
one’s specifically religious beliefs are held in a disordered way—they are too
intense, too judgmental, or too unbalanced. To say that someone is a hypocrite
is to say that they are willing to put burdens on others in public that they
themselves do not follow in private. These two character flaws seem distinct;
how could they possibly be related enough to fit under the same label?  One way
to do make them fit is to assume that people who are too religiously committed
and judgmental about others cannot possibly be willing to apply the same
standards to themselves, at least in private. Another way is to operate through
the Golden Rule: no one who applies their religious standards to other people in
such a severe way would be willing to have analogous standards applied to them
in the same way.
Yet putting those two definitions together, no matter how uneasily, helps us see
why the charge of bigotry is so explosive: In essence, the charge means that the
target’s reasons for acting are so flawed that they are either intellectually obtuse
or could not possibly be acting in good faith. So the charge freezes the targets
between the Scylla of stupidity and the Charybdis of hypocrisy. That is not a
comfortable place to be. No wonder those targets aren’t in the mood for moral
self-reflection and self-criticism, as McClain’s work shows.
The meaning of the term “bigot” has evolved, of course. According to the
Merriam-Webster on line dictionary, a “bigot” is “a person who is obstinately or
intolerantly devoted to his or her own opinions and prejudices especially: one
who regards or treats the members of a group (such as a racial or ethnic group)
with hatred and intolerance.” Although the reach of the term is broader, as
McClain shows, its application continues to raise the question between reasons
and motives, soundness of judgments in categorizing other people and probity of
purpose in making such judgments.
In the cases currently under discussion, which pit rights of religious freedom
against the non-discrimination rights of the rights of the LGBTQ community, the
prevailing understanding of religion in American law compounds the problem.
Motive and Rationale: Reason, Feeling, and Religion
As many scholars of religious studies have pointed out, that definition is highly
influenced by the country’s Protestant origins. It is defined in terms of individuals
rather than communities, and tends to speak of belief in terms of a strong
feeling rather than rationally held commitments. Indeed, faith is often set over
and against reason in this conception. Moreover, on this picture, religion tends to
be a “private” matter. It is not something that is discussed in public, especially
not in the political sphere. In public, it is viewed more as a matter of emotional
attachment than intellectual commitment. It can be applauded or derogated, but
not intellectually interrogated.
This view of religion is reinforced in the context of First Amendment litigation.
American courts steer clear of making any assessment of the rationality of
litigants’ religious claims, and even of their religiously based moral claims. When
tasked when evaluating free exercise claims, the operative question facing the
courts is whether the claimants are sincere. In the context of a McClain’s
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question, sincerity not only shows that a person is religious, but also that he or
she is not a hypocrite—that he or she does not fit one of the two key prongs of
the original definition of bigot.  But what exactly is sincerity and how does one
show or test it? In the contexts litigating American religion, sincerity seem to be
equated with depth and intensity of personal feeling, rather than coherence of
intellectual and moral judgment.
In some ways, this equation of sincerity with honest and deep emotional
commitment is understandable, given the dominance of Evangelical
Protestantism in the United States. In that strand of Christianity, the subjective
connection with God is an important part of being saved from damnation. 
Nineteenth and twentieth century liberal theology also emphasized feeling rather
than reason; the great German Protestant theologian Friedrich Schleiermacher
influentially defined religion as a “feeling of absolute dependence” as a strategy
for reconciling Christianity with Enlightenment conceptions of reason.
But Christianity, even Evangelical Protestantism, was never a matter of mere
feeling. Even John Wesley, who described his salvific encounter with God as
having his heart “strangely warmed,” recognized that discerning the content of
Christian belief was far more than a matter of consulting one’s own feelings. He
articulated what is now known as the “Wesleyan quadrilateral,” which directs
believers to examine emerging ethical questions in light of the insights of
Scripture, tradition, and reason, as well as experience. Experience might include
feeling, but was not limited to it—it is best understood as reflective living in the
light of faith. Moreover, these sources are not hermetically sealed from one
another. Discerning how to interpret Scripture is an intellectual conundrum itself.
In his fascinating volume The Civil War as a Theological Crisis (2015), American
religious historian Mark Noll describes two divergent ways of approaching the
Bible to deal with slavery: those opposed to it tended to emphasize the “spirit” of
the text, and its pervasive themes of love, human dignity, brotherhood, etc.
Those who supported slavery focused on the “letter” of particular biblical
passages that seemed to support (or at least not to oppose) the practice.
As I noted above, the charge of “bigotry” presents conservative religious
believers with a choice: they can accept the Scylla of irrationality or cling to the
Charybdis of hypocrisy. Encouraged by the current shape of religious liberty
litigation, they opt to be irrational (or perhaps arational) rather than hypocrites.
By stressing their sincerity, they insulate the substance of their claims about how
human beings should live and human societies should organize themselves from
judicial scrutiny. They also increasingly think their claims should be insulated
from scrutiny from their fellow citizens and fellow believers.
 But no normative tradition that makes claims about how human beings should
organize their individual and collective lives can be so intellectually insulated,
whether it is religious or secular. And most of the mainstream religious traditions
in the United States do not see themselves as so isolated: they train their
leaders in divinity schools, many of which are attached to universities. The
Becket Fund and other religious liberty groups are doing American religious
groups no favors by encouraging them to frame themselves as sincere well-
meaning naïfs, escaping the charge of bigotry by emphasizing sincerity rather
than rationality of belief.
Competing Normative Traditions
The issue of rational belief raises a larger question. According to what framework
is a religious or moral framework to be judged rational for purposes of
constitutional adjudication? McClain’s book suggests that the ultimate touchstone
is the normative framework of the Constitution itself—she reads it as a political
charter for promoting individual dignity, equality, and respect for difference,
which progressively implements a democratic egalitarian vision over the course
of generations. Ironically enough, the Puritans would be sympathetic to the
vision of the Constitution as a political covenant implementing a general moral
vision for the nation as a whole. I am sympathetic to that vision myself.
But there are at least three obstacles to using this vision as the touchstone to
adjudicate cases of discrimination. First, not everyone reads the Constitution in
that fashion. Originalists tend to view it more or less as a blueprint for limited
government, incorporating procedural checks and balances and protection for a
basic and somewhat static set of individual rights—especially the right of
religious freedom. Second, the era in which a liberal political philosophy could
effectively work hand in glove to support a liberal constitutional jurisprudence
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has come and gone in both academia and the culture. As one recent book 
argues, we are long past the era of “peak Rawls” (See Katrina Forrester, In the 
Shadow of Justice, 2019). And the victory of Donald Trump, in part based on his 
promise to appoint originalists to the bench, suggests that a sizable minority of 
the population is not totally comfortable with a developmental liberal approach to 
jurisprudence. Whatever its merits, we are at most one Supreme Court vote 
away from a repudiation of the progressive vision of constitutional interpretation 
McClain outlines.
In the context of these three obstacles, how might tensions between religious 
liberty and anti-discrimination rights for LGBTQ citizens evolve in the future? One 
possibility is that church teaching will develop on these issues in the way that it 
has on racial issues. For example, I know many theologians and philosophers 
working out of many different branches of Christianity who do not rest content 
with sincerity; they are doing the hard intellectual work of trying to integrate 
new insights into their religious traditions. They are not consulting their feelings. 
They are making their arguments. Such development is not unprecedented. 
Inspired by the success of the American experiment in democracy and religious 
freedom, the Roman Catholic Church authoritatively developed its teaching on 
church –state issues in the Second Vatican Council.
A second possibility is that intellectual coherence is sacrificed for civic peace and 
political expedience. Some say that the nature and scope of exemptions to 
generally enacted anti-discrimination laws is not justified on the basis of 
principle, but as the price of not provoking a backlash. Eventually, the old 
generation will die off, and a new, more open-minded generation will take its 
place. I am not sure this is the case, even with respect to race, as recent tragic 
events indicate. Church teaching may have developed to condemn racism. That 
does not mean church-goers have extirpated it from their hearts.
The third possibility increasingly worries me, based upon my reading around 
religious blogs and twitter feeds. If polarization and alienation continues, I would 
not be entirely shocked to see certain strands of originalism developing into even 
more robust calls for states’ rights. If conservative religious believers see 
themselves as living within a moral tradition that is not only fundamentally 
incompatible with, but also unable to communicate effectively with the Rawlsian 
tradition of liberal democracy, they may think their best option is to set up their 
own political communities, guided by their own religiously infused normative 
commitments. The First Amendment’s prohibition of establishment of religion 
was only applied to the states in the mid-twentieth century (Everson v. Board of 
Education, 1947); it would not be too hard for a determined originalist to undo 
this extension. This would help clear the way for states to establish a vision of 
the good life, as well as the rights and duties of both believers and non-
believers, which was unapologetically inflected with religious belief. While all 
states would be tolerant, at least some states would no longer maintain the 
pretense of being religiously neutral in their definition of the nature and scope of 
toleration.
If this happens, the mid-twentieth century version of the American dream of a 
strong, robust, and compassionate solidarity in pluralism will have died, or at 
least have transformed beyond recognition. I like this dream. And it probably 
won’t happen. It’s probably just an unfounded fear rooted in the anomie and 
anxiousness of this pandemic. Or so I keep telling myself.
Cathleen Kaveny is Darald and Juliet Libby Professor of Law and Theology at 
Boston College. She can be reached at cathleen.kaveny@bc.edu.
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